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9. The Malfunctions of New Public 
Management: A case study of 
governance in Indigenous affairs1 
Ian Marsh
Indigenous policy presents in acute form a case study of challenges to present 
public administration practice. Successive governments have promised to reduce 
extreme disadvantage and to do this in conjunction with affected citizens.2 But 
failures persist. In looking for explanations, Dr Peter Shergold (2006) has not 
only arraigned governance as a threshold cause but also set a high bar for its 
practice:
I am aware that, for some fifteen years as a public administrator, too 
much of what I have done on behalf of government for the very best 
of motives has had the very worst of outcomes … In my personal 
opinion three things need to be done … We need to tailor government 
programs to the particular circumstances of discrete communities … We 
must ensure that discretionary government expenditures are negotiated 
to goals that address local needs … Community challenges are almost 
invariably holistic in their nature and require a variety of programs from 
all three tiers of government to be delivered in a coordinated whole of 
government manner.
1 This is an abridged version of a paper prepared for the Alice Springs think tank Remote Focus in 2011 
as part of a review of governance in remote Australia. The original paper, ‘The Evolution of Governance in Remote 
Australia: From centralised and top-down towards contextualised and collaborative approaches’, and the final report, 
‘Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland’, are both available at www.desertknowledge.com.au.
2 For example, a recent policy statement (Australian Government 2011) states: ‘Genuine engagement with 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians is fundamental to our efforts to improve life outcomes and 
close the gap in the indigenous disadvantage … A critical step in improving outcomes for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Australians is for government agencies, service providers and contractors to engage them 
as valued stakeholders in the development, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, 
programs, services and legislation that have an impact on them.’ Also in November 2011, the Commonwealth 
released its ‘Indigenous Economic Development Strategy’ which states: ‘Government cannot act alone. 
Success depends on working in partnership with indigenous leaders communities and individuals and with 
business, industry peak bodies and non-government organizations.’ Writing in 2005, Peter Shergold, the 
former Secretary of DPMC and a primary author of the current framework, observed: ‘We need to drive 
governance programs in the direction of connectedness. Programs need to be made more flexible, responsive 
to community needs and priorities and delivered in a holistic manner … More importantly, there needs to be 
a delivery of programs in a seamless manner to local communities’ (2006).
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Such aspirations are echoed in more general terms in recent reports on broader 
public sector reform. At the federal level, such ideas figure prominently in the 
Moran Review (AGRGA 2010), and at a state level, in the Western Australian 
Economic Audit Committee Report (WAEAC 2009). 
So how equipped is the Australian public service to meet such challenges? 
This chapter suggests there is a long way to go. Moreover, the central obstacles 
to their realisation lie in structural features that are keystones of new public 
management. Specifically:
• Governance arrangements are a threshold cause of policy failure in 
Indigenous affairs. As discussed later in detail, centralised protocols and 
siloed departments undercut local responsiveness. Reframed governance will 
not, of course, by itself solve the many problems of Indigenous disadvantage. 
That can ultimately only be achieved with the active involvement of the 
affected citizens. But this essential mobilisation is negated by the present 
governance framework and cannot be remedied within it.
• The challenge in designing new policies is a structural one. Local discretions 
in service delivery and decentralised governance designs are unattainable 
within the present protocols surrounding budgeting, siloed departments, 
human resources management and accountability arrangements. All these 
protocols need ultimately to be reworked if the circle is to be squared between 
local discretion, continuous improvement, and centralised accountability. 
Britain has begun to experiment in whole-of-government budgeting (NAO 
2013). But ultimately the challenge goes deeper, perhaps ultimately to a 
framework that Charles Sabel has described as ‘experimentalist governance’ 
(for example, Sabel 2004; Sabel and Zeitlin 2011).
• The challenge in designing new policies is also a strategic one; a rethink 
from fundamentals is required (for example, Shergold 2013). This is first and 
foremost a challenge to imagination. A paradigm shift — one that challenges 
structurally embedded habits, practices, and approaches — will always be 
hard to accomplish. This is particularly hard in Australia’s policy system 
which has few if any platforms that can host appropriate conversations and 
exchanges.
At the heart of this chapter is a simple claim: there is an imperative need 
to reframe governance. This composite concept recognises the essential 
interdependence between the formal apparatus of the state and its publics. The 
parties are engaged in a dynamic exchange, the opposite of directed, deferential, 
passive or paternalistic linkage. In achieving positive and sustainable outcomes, 
engagement has a primary rather than a secondary role.3 Compounding this 
3 For a sensitive discussion of the complexity of choice in an Indigenous context, particularly the tensions 
between individualist and collectivist patterns, see Rowse 2002, 2012.
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challenge is the overlap of policy responsibilities between federal and state 
government. While present rhetoric gestures to the intergovernmental, systemic 
and contextual character of policy challenges, practice falls far short of stated 
ambitions.
Indigenous affairs display these difficulties in sharp relief. The following 
section explores the structural barriers which inhibit decentralised, whole-of-
government practice. This is followed by a review of responses elsewhere to 
analogous challenges. The conclusion evaluates the challenge of grafting such 
approaches into Australian public administration. 
What are the structural barriers to whole-of-
government?
Two official Management Advisory Committee reports (2004, 2007) noted five 
changes in organisation and processes that were deemed essential to underpin 
whole-of-government practice:
1. substantial initial cross-agency/stakeholder agreement about the broad 
purposes to be pursued; 
2. use of the outcomes budget framework to pool resources and to create 
appropriate accountability frameworks; 
3. lead-agency staff empowered with sufficient authority to manage whole-of-
government settings and to lead the engagement of local stakeholders; 
4. empowering these same managers to engage with relevant individuals and 
interests; and
5. ensure the individuals engaged in these latter roles have the appropriate 
networking, collaboration and entrepreneurial skills.
How did this unfold in Indigenous affairs?
A first step involves assessment of the multitude and variety of programs that 
have been established to drive change in local communities. The ‘Strategic 
Evaluation of Indigenous Programs’ (Department of Finance 2010) offers the 
most recent comprehensive overview. It identified no less than 232 individual 
programs which in one way or another support Indigenous Australians. This 
report reviews these programs in the context of the various broad outcomes 
that the government has established. An earlier Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO) report (2007) focused on the four primary departments: Department 
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of Education and Science (DES), Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations (DEWR), Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs (FaCSIA), and Health and Ageing. This report identifies 94 programs, 
either mainstream or niche, that are relevant to Indigenous affairs. DES operates 
15 Indigenous-specific programs and 43 mainstream programs that have 
Indigenous applications; DEWR operates 11 Indigenous-specific programs and 
the Job Network; FaCSIA operates six Indigenous-specific and six mainstream 
programs; Health and Ageing operates five Indigenous-specific programs and 
nine mainstream programs. To add to the complexity, many of these major 
programs have sub-components.
To coordinate funding, the federal government decided to establish Indigenous 
Coordinating Centres (ICCs) at a regional or area level. In practice, coordination 
can be achieved by one of two means: by brokering linkages between 
communities and programs; or by joining individual programs into a funding 
block, which is more demanding. Meantime, to test the model, trials at selected 
sites were introduced in 2003.
In a report on these trials, Gray (2006) explored the challenge of program 
management as perceived on-the-ground, in this particular case from Wadeye. 
The trial was intended to reduce the number of individual programs that local 
communities need to manage. In fact, in the course of the trial the number of 
relevant programs increased to 90. In another example, Dillon and Westbury 
(2007, p. 66) list the five Commonwealth programs that could be tapped to fund 
natural resource management on Indigenous land: 
An important and growing policy area where in recent years scores of 
Indigenous ranger programs have emerged across northern Australia 
focused on land and resource management. Program funding in this 
area comes from a diverse array of agencies: the National Heritage Trust, 
the Indigenous Protected Areas Program, CDEP, STEP and the ABA 
… Programs vary in size from hundreds of millions (for example the 
CDEP or ARHP) to less than half a million (for example the Indigenous 
Children’s Program).
With 39 per cent of the Indigenous population under 15, education is another 
critical area. The same authors note the array of programs relevant here:
The national flagship programs include the Youth Allowance and 
Abstudy: the former is targeted at young people studying, undertaking 
training for Australian apprenticeship, looking for work, or sick; the 
latter at indigenous students. Over and above this, FaCSIA has four 
‘niche’ programs which provide youth services of various kinds with a 
total national budget of $34.6 million and a client base of approximately 
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340 000 nationally. DEST has at least ten youth related Indigenous 
specific niche programs … the data on numbers of service providers 
suggests that the availability of these programs in remote Australia is 
very patchy … It is clear that across the national government there 
are a couple of hundred different programs potentially allocable to the 
circumstances of remote citizens. Access is a different matter entirely 
(Dillon and Westbury 2007, pp. 67–68).
Finally, they note the bewildering array of programs aimed at Indigenous 
housing:
The existence of concurrent state and national responsibilities means 
that in some areas programs are duplicated by each jurisdiction. Housing 
is a classic example where states, territories and national governments 
deliver both mainstream and Indigenous housing and housing related 
programs, and even within the national government there are a number 
of separate Indigenous housing programs (CHIP/NAHS, CHIP/AACAP, 
FHBH) all delivering housing and essential services at the community 
level, along with the Australian Regional Housing Programme which 
funds the states and territories to deliver housing at the community 
level (Dillon and Westbury 2007, p. 65).
The whole-of-government architecture was designed to ensure these programs 
are accessed by the citizens that they are intended to serve. How effective have 
these arrangements proven to be?
Whole-of-government architecture
Since whole-of-government arrangements were introduced in 2002, there have 
been at least nine reviews. The first four covered the initial COAG trials and the 
rest focused on subsequent developments. Seven were official or commissioned 
evaluations and the remainder were independent academic assessments: Urbis, 
Keys and Young 2006; Morgan Disney and Associates 2006; Gray and Sanders 
2006; Gray 2006; ANAO 2007; KPMG 2007; Hunt 2007; FaHCSIA 2004; O’Flynn 
et al. 2011. All these reviews repeat points stressed in the Management Advisory 
Committee documents, namely that whole-of-government will not work without 
devolution of authority, funding, accountability and coordinated organisation. 
They also all found continuing and unresolved administrative difficulties.
As an introduction to these unresolved problems, consider the case of Mutitjulu, 
ironically the first community named in the Northern Territory Emergency 
Response (NTER). Before whole-of-government was conceived, this community 
tried, over more than a decade, to obtain for itself a new style of governance 
(Smith 2009). Its efforts foundered on immovable central structures. This 
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story starts in 1991 when the Women’s Council prepared a report highlighting 
concerns about ‘controlling and caring for children’. A series of submissions 
and discussions followed. In 2000, the community council at Mutitjulu asked 
Centrelink, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, and the then 
Department of Families and Community Services to work with it to develop a 
practical strategy to deal with welfare dependency and related family problems. 
Following a consultation, the Community Council itself proposed a Participation 
and Partnership Agreement. The departments did not respond. Why?
First, the key departments would not support an ‘All in’ community 
model of welfare reform and would not support linking Youth Allowance 
with school attendance, even though these had been specifically 
requested by community members … Second, Centrelink and FACS 
would not countenance an indigenous community working with them 
to develop and implement locally-relevant breaching rules. Neither 
would they countenance a community organisation being provided 
with a delegation under the Social Security Act in order to do so … 
Third, entrenched inter-departmental turf wars in Canberra meant that 
the departments concerned were unable to negotiate a common position 
… And finally the Australian government was unable or unwilling to 
reform the chaotic state of its departmental program funding in order 
to streamline the pooled funding and grant reporting arrangements 
that would have been required … In late June 2007, the Australian 
government announced that Mutitjulu would be the first community 
into which it activates national emergency measures. It will do so 
unilaterally (Smith 2009, p. 6).
So far as coordination is concerned, we will see little has changed.
The findings of the various evaluations affirm that whole-of-government is 
confounded at the critical regional and ICC levels. The obstacles are structural, 
not contingent. Consider the two most recent reports, an official report conducted 
by KPMG (2007) and an independent report conducted by academics from 
The Australian National University and the University of Canberra (O’Flynn 
et al. 2011). The KPMG study involved a review of internal documents as well 
as interviews with 158 Australian and state government agency staff and 35 
community organisations. The report compared the proclaimed objectives of the 
policy with the experience and observations of local staff. Despite six years’ 
experience and at least eight preceding reviews, structural obstacles to joined-
up work persisted. Here is a summary:
• Departmental silos persisted: Line agency staff presented to communities/
organisations as representative of their agency. Communities/organisations 
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reported that they did not know who to talk to. ICC staff and line agency 
staff rarely visit communities together (p. 19).
• Funding protocols prevented discussion with applicants: Many line agency 
staff were unable to provide governance and financial management assistance 
to organisations due to probity issues relating to assessment of funding 
applications (p. 21).
• ICC managers lacked authority: Managers indicated that they did not have 
authority to gather agency staff support. Line agencies confirmed that their 
staff remained their direct responsibility (p. 23).
• Funding and reporting arrangements inhibited whole-of-government 
collaboration: Line agencies have different program guidelines, funding 
rounds and delegations, and different risk assessment protocols. In some cases 
this resulted in applications undergoing up to eight different risk assessments 
(p. 29). One ICC took over 12 months to negotiate and approve an SRA which was 
worth under $50,000 in funding (p. 32). One agency may apply more rigorous risk 
assessment for applications over $100,000, while another agency’s more rigorous 
assessment only applies to applications over $150 000 (p.34).
• The problems are structural: ‘The implementation of whole-of-government 
collaboration in ICCs is an area requiring significant improvements. Many of 
the issues that impede whole-of-government are structure and have little to 
do with ICC staff and management’s willingness to collaborate’ (pp. 10, 29).
The findings of the university-based study (O’Flynn et al. 2011) echo these 
conclusions, albeit in more graphic terms. This study was based on 48 field 
interviews covering staff at ICCs, state and regional offices, and in Canberra. 
It suggests that, despite the top-down whole-of-government effort, Mutitjulu’s 
experience has not been transcended. Their conclusion is unequivocal: ‘Due to 
entrenched barriers, which permeate the broader public service, ICCs have been 
a failed experiment.’
Like KPMG, O’Flynn et al. identify structural failings in the basic organisational 
design:
• No or limited assignment of authority to the ICC managers, 
• An ad hoc approach to the representation of departments (which meant staff 
were withdrawn as cost pressures emerged); 
• An under-investment in skills; and
• Inconsistent operating systems.
They cite the comments of ICC managers, first on their delegations of authority:
I could not go out and direct another person to do something in this ICC 
… because they’re not from my agency. I could (only) ask, influence, beg 
(Executive Level, ICC: 248).
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Whole of government doesn’t work … when you’ve got all different 
agencies sitting in the one place, supposedly working together … 
they’re supposed to be all collaborating and telling each other what 
they’re doing … I’m telling you it doesn’t work and I work in an ICC 
and I’ve been there since the day it started (Executive Level, ICC: 248).
The fact that we’re co-located with [Department A] and [Department B] 
and a couple of [Department C’s] people is just window dressing. So there’s 
no whole of government activity between them … There’s no practical 
program [or] whole of government approach (APS Level, ICC: 248).
The NTER Review also picked up these criticisms but this time from the 
perspective of the clients:
There was extensive comment in communities about the lack of co-
ordination across locally based professional staff. Between the GBMs, 
Community Employment Brokers and shire service managers, there is 
not a clear point of authority or coordination (p. 86).
A second set of unresolved governance issues arose from conflicting vertical 
and horizontal tensions which cut across in the administration of programs. 
According to O’Flynn et al.:
The pervasiveness of a program focus and the silos that it creates were 
seen as impossible to combat even in a setting where there was physical 
co-location and strong endorsement from Ministers and Secretaries 
(2011: 249).
A third problematic element involved centralised decision-making. This 
aspiration also fell foul of more embedded administrative practices and 
requirements: 
The idea [was] for ICCs to have a pool of money that they could make 
decisions about. Well, in the great thing about being risk averse that was 
all centralised back in Canberra: … useless basically. It just went against 
the whole thing about whole of government which is about sharing, 
devolving, not controlling everything, but taking responsibility and it’s 
the same pattern. And that was a bit of its undoing, in fact because 
it was to give people the power to do the deal on the ground (Senior 
Executive Service, ICC, p. 249).
Most recently, under the 2009 National Partnership Agreements between the 
Commonwealth and the states, the same broad arrangements have been extended 
to coordinate the delivery of programs across jurisdictions. Six agreements have 
already been signed and others are foreshowed in relation to native title claims 
arrangements, remote infrastructure and healthy food. In general, the parties also 
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commit to ‘developing a co-ordinated approach’, and ‘enabling initiatives to be 
delivered in a manner appropriate to needs in particular locations’. To oversee 
the arrangements, a Coordinator-General based in Canberra was appointed in 
2009. This position was abolished in 2014.
Accountabilities as a structural barrier to local 
effectiveness 
Central accountability requirements create another barrier to on-the-ground 
effectiveness. Take health services. In the interests of enhancing local choice 
and control, the Aboriginal community controlled health services were 
established in the 1980s. Funding was later transferred to the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission and grants were on a yearly basis, but with an 
expectation of continuance. The Commonwealth Department of Health assumed 
responsibility in 1995 and thereafter funding increased. The pattern of funding 
has since further evolved with most services now drawing support from several 
sources: a core operating grant from the Office for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Health; state government health department grants; and by proposal 
driven niche-funding that could include broader social purposes.
Each funding source adopts its own application process, accountability 
framework and priorities. In an assessment of these arrangements, Lavoie et al. 
(2009, p. 6) note:
Analyses conducted by the Victorian Department of Health suggests 
that the reporting and compliance burden is disproportionate compared 
to that imposed on other small and medium-size funded agencies.
For example, Aboriginal agencies receiving on average $2 million were 
accountable for between 26–30 activities. Non-governmental organisations 
typically received total funding of $10 million for the same array of activities. 
This study also found that agencies can be required to produce up to 59 separate 
reports for 13 programs. This boosts transaction costs disproportionately. 
Further, in a small service, disentangling the daily time allocation of a single 
staff member between varieties of programs can be wholly artificial. Finally, a 
12-month funding cycle makes the recruitment of staff precarious.
These multiple accountabilities and the associated burden of transaction costs 
have persisted despite having figured so strongly in other evaluations. This 
suggests that the requirements derive from wider structural imperatives and 
cannot be excised without systemic change.
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Consultation and the development of social capital
As noted at the outset, every official report since 2001 has emphasised the 
imperative of working with and through local communities (for example, 
Commonwealth Grants Commission 2001; Morgan Disney and Associates 2006; 
NTER Review 2008; Department of Finance 2010; Productivity Commission 
2012). To illustrate the complexities that can arise, Edmunds (2010, p. 16) 
cites the negotiations over James Price Point, which involved Woodside and 
a proposed liquified natural gas development. Negotiations were conducted 
with the Kimberley Land Council, the organisation which had statutory 
responsibilities for consultation under the Native Title Act. The council had 
secured a consensus amongst key traditional owners. But a dissident group 
challenged these processes. Edmunds (2010, p. 16) comments:
This is a common situation and one that traditional law could once have 
dealt with. However, it fits uneasily into contemporary decision making, 
raising a crucial question about how much, and whose consent is needed 
for informed consent.
If this is one dimension of the issue, another is the quixotic (from the perspective 
of local communities) behaviour of their governmental interlocutors. Take the 
NTER, which banned sales of alcohol on Aboriginal land. According to Marian 
Brady, a specialist in alcohol use in Indigenous communities:
The (political grandstanding associated with the NTER) was a little 
strange considering that most Aboriginal land in the Territory was 
already dry. There were already 107 general restricted areas, all on 
Aboriginal land and all in non–urban areas except for one town camp 
in Alice Springs … the alcohol recommendations in the Little Children 
are Sacred report … are designed to work with and enhance the NTs 
existing legislative structure … the Intervention measures unhelpfully 
cut across them (cited in Edmunds 2010, p. 19).
Another example involved the impact of the NTER at Wadeye, an early trial site:
When a crisis erupted at the Wadeye trial site … the Commonwealth 
government resorted to a more coercive approach characteristic of 
hierarchical or contract government … It has chosen not to develop 
housing through the legitimately elected Thamururr Regional Council, 
with whom it signed the COAG trial agreement thereby by-passing and 
potentially undermining the very indigenous governance structure it 
partnered with only four years ago, and to which it remains formally 
committed in the NT bilateral agreement (Hunt 2007, p. 167).
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Smith (2009) describes the proposed governance arrangements for the West 
Arnhem Shire that were developed slowly and after protracted negotiations 
that had begun in 2004. Their purpose was to plan implementation of a new 
local government shire covering the entire region. Following protracted on-
the-ground negotiations over three years, which progressively built support 
amongst relevant groups and communities, a new governance structure had 
been settled. In 2007, the Intervention aborted these arrangements, leaving 
behind a frustrated and cynical local community. 
According to the ANAO, in 2007, 75 per cent of 257 managers surveyed responded 
positively to the statement: ‘The Indigenous Affairs Arrangements (IAAs) have 
encouraged consultation with indigenous communities at the local and regional 
levels.’ How effective were these conversations from the perspective of their 
interlocutors? The on-the-ground evidence is not positive. For example, in 
May 2010, DEEWR and FaHCSIA issued a draft Indigenous economic strategy. 
Submissions were invited and consultations held with Indigenous communities 
throughout Australia. The following are the reporter’s notes on the consultations 
held in various remote centres in November 2010. In Alice Springs, for example:
Approximately 22 (indigenous) participants attended the workshop … 
People participated in both the questions and answer session and the 
table discussions but there was widespread criticism of the relevance of 
the Indigenous Economic Development Strategy to remote areas and the 
likelihood of anything changing on the ground … There are no economic 
foundations in remote communities and this needs to be acknowledged 
… There was widespread criticism that the strategy was homogenising 
and represented an urban western model … (it) needs to respond to 
the different circumstances, opportunities, economies and drivers in 
remote regional areas...There are so many economic strategies around 
that people are blasé about ‘just another plan’ … The gap between the 
strategy and what is happening on the ground is very wide … There is a 
different sort of economy operating in remote areas. It’s not just a matter 
of transferring these into real jobs, they are real jobs but not recognised 
as such.
The report records analogous sentiments from participants in all the other 
consultations sites covering Broome, Cairns, Port Lincoln and Karratha. Here is 
one more observation from Karratha:
Real engagement means listening to indigenous people and not just 
telling them … previous feedback for policy development over the years 
has been ignored. There is no apparent correlation between what the 
Australian government proposes and what indigenous people want … 
Different communities have different needs and opportunities.
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The overall funding framework
At a material level, W. H. Stanner’s indictment of the ‘great Australian silence’ 
in relation to Indigenous Australians is reflected in the legacy of past policy 
failures:
The list would include in no particular order, the pre-existing failure of 
educational outcomes, which lead to a largely non-literate indigenous 
citizenry, extreme housing shortages for personnel required to deliver 
government funded programmes and service across remote Australia; 
poor law enforcement and less than optimal levels of intellectual capital 
within government agencies relevant to remote service delivery … 
The combined absence of social and physical infrastructure means that 
there is nothing for governments to graft mainstream services onto as 
happens elsewhere. Government appear to discount or underestimate 
the importance of a pre-existing network of social, physical governance 
and business infrastructure … (Dillon and Westbury 2007, p. 59).
One important source of equality in services for Australians is the periodic 
determinations of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGrC). Via complex 
metrics, the CGrC attempts to equalise funding for service provision around 
Australia. But there are several problems. First, determinations are based on 
average or mainstream needs. There are no special provisions or allowances for 
remedying acute backlogs such as those that exist in remote Australia. These 
were comprehensively documented by the CGrC in its 2001 report. 
Second, while the Commission grants money on the basis of an assessment of 
needs in particular areas like housing, transport etc., there is no requirement for 
governments to spend their allocations in these areas. The states and territories 
are free to spend as they choose. Indeed, the states and territories may also use 
the existence of special Commonwealth programs as a ground for reducing their 
own allocations to Indigenous services.
There is no mechanism to check that funds are spent in line with the principles 
behind their allocation. A significant proportion of the funds allocated by both 
the CGrC and the Commonwealth to the Northern Territory are in recognition of 
the special needs of Indigenous Australians. According to a Northern Territory 
Council of Social Services analysis of the 2008 Northern Territory budget:
The spending priorities of the NT government exacerbate the differences 
in measures and senses of equality for low-income and disadvantaged 
people thereby contributing to the reduced life expectancy, poor 
health, violence and other differences that they are intended to address 
(NTCOSS 2008; see also The Australian, 24 October 2009). 
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Another issue concerns allocations to local government. These are determined 
on a per capita basis:
The bizarre result is that jurisdictions like the Northern Territory with 
one sixth of the Australian land mass receive less in local government 
assistance than is notionally allocated to the population of Geelong 
(Dillon and Westbury 2007, p. 188).
Whole-of-government policy development: A case 
study of CDEP 
Whole-of-government is difficult to achieve not just in on-the-ground delivery, 
but also in processes of cross-departmental policy development. Despite its 
popularity and considerable impact in remote Australia, at the same time as it is 
promulgating ambitious employment targets, the government is also curtailing 
the Community Development Employment Project (CDEP). At its peak, CDEP 
engaged some 40,000 people:
From 2005, CDEP has been systematically dismantled … Without much 
evidence, CDEP is being blamed for cost shifting by governments and 
for poor mainstream employment outcomes … as CDEP is dismantled 
people will be given the choice of mainstream work or welfare, on the 
proviso that work might require migration from home communities … 
This policy change fails to recognise Indigenous aspirations, cultures 
and life projects (Altman 2009, p. 8).
The specific situation of citizens in remote Australia has seemingly received 
short shrift. What is to be done in remote communities where there is zero 
conventional economic infrastructure? For example, to illustrate the effectiveness 
of CDEP, Altman describes the experience of the Kuninjku community in west 
Arnhem Land:
For the majority of Aboriginal people in remote communities migration 
away from ancestral lands … and from extended kin networks will 
be neither an aspiration nor a solution. This in turn suggests that key 
institutions like CDEP that are currently being dismantled will need to 
be retained (Altman 2009, p. 13).
He notes the specific contributions of CDEP to the Kuninjku economy: harvesting 
game for local consumption; producing art for sale in the national and global art 
market; and being employed in paid provision of environmental services.
A review of CDEP by the Department of Finance (2009) found that the scheme 
had very limited success in fulfilling its work readiness charter and that it was 
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almost impossible to assess its community development contribution. It also 
noted these goals are likely to conflict. Altman’s (2011) detailed evidence that 
the scheme had worked positively as an enabler of remote livelihood possibilities 
in the hybrid economy played no role in the finance assessment.
The changes to the CDEP scheme in the Northern Territory also indicate the 
difficulties government faces in managing policy development on a whole-of-
government basis. The reductions in CDEP employment displaced populations 
from outstations and other settlements. But the scheme was run down without 
town camp capacities being augmented. Moreover, there was no development 
of new town-based employment opportunities and no or little opportunity for 
mainstream employment.
Beyond whole-of-government: Squaring the 
circle between central accountability and 
place-centred governance
The previous section catalogued the structural difficulties that have hampered 
realisation of whole-of-government aspirations. These include the relevance 
of local contexts; high and increasing transaction costs; a turn to micro-
management; the confounding of freedom of action on the part of local staff; 
and, above all, the incompatibility between highly centralised organisational, 
HR and funding protocols and local discretions. In this respect, Australian 
experience matches that of other jurisdictions, which have tried whole-of-
government and found it wanting. In search of remedies, a number of new or 
supplementary frameworks have been introduced to shift the locus of choice 
and decision away from highly centralised arrangements towards more localised 
contexts. This is reflected both in the ‘Total Place’ (HM Treasury and Department 
of Communities and Local Government 2010) initiatives in England and in the 
attention to place-based approaches in current OECD work. In both cases, 
the drastic cuts in public spending following the 2008 global financial crisis 
have coloured implementation (for example, Crowe 2011). Also relevant are 
‘learning-by-doing’ approaches which offer a new accountability framework to 
reconcile national concerns with local initiative and freedom of action. Finally, 
imaginative ‘place-based’ developments, covering the provision of otherwise 
threatened local services and the realisation of efficiencies through collaboration 
between authorities at the local level, are also evident in Australia. These are 
detailed in a comprehensive report on local government in outback Queensland 
(Dollery and Johnson 2007). These varied governance designs are reviewed in 
turn. A concluding section explores the consistency of these approaches with 
recent official reviews of the public sector in Australia. 
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The ‘Big Society’ in Britain
The coalition government in Britain has sought to implement more decentralised 
governance arrangements via its ‘Big Society’ agenda.4 
Decentralised governance represents a deliberate shift away from the top-
down pattern which was common to both the Thatcher‒Major and Blair‒
Brown governments. In particular, the Blair‒Brown years were marked by 
substantially increased investment in the public sector and the development 
of arrangements to enhance central control, but in conjunction with whole-of-
government delivery at the local level. Organisational arrangements to buttress 
central control and to drive service improvement included special units in the 
Cabinet office to facilitate strategy development and to drive program change. 
In addition, the performance framework was extended with a plethora of targets 
and measures. To facilitate joined-up working, joint funding agreements were 
also introduced. There is an extensive literature on all these developments (for 
example, Parker et al. 2010; Barber 2008; Marsh and Miller 2012, particularly 
chapters 3 and 4). 
The profound limitations of this experience fanned interest in more radically 
decentralised approaches. An early move occurred in 2006 when the Lyons 
review of local government proposed attention to place-based approaches. In 
subsequent years, within and beyond government, attention to alternatives 
flourished. Think tanks have been important contributors to the emerging 
agenda (for example, Demos (Wind-Cowie 2010); Institute of Public Policy 
Research 2010; Institute for Government (Adonis and Sims 2011); New 
Economics Foundation (Coote 2010)). In addition, the House of Commons 
Public Administration Committee and the Communities and Local Government 
Committee have serially reviewed aspects of the new approach.5
The government has since taken several steps to advance its decentralising 
agenda, notably the establishment of its Whole Place Community Budgets 
Programme. This sought to shift the initiative in service design from central 
to place-based authorities. It sought to join up relevant central and local 
4 Greg Clark (now a minister in the British government) wrote a book in 2003 which he describes as making 
the case that ‘if central government is everywhere, then local government is nowhere’ (Clark 2003).
5 A comprehensive list of House of Commons committee enquiries on community budgets and the ‘Big 
Society’ follows: Community Budgets (Communities Select Committee 2013); Integration across Government 
and Whole-Place Community Budgets (Public Accounts Committee 2013); Taking Forward Community Budgets 
(Communities SC 2012); Localisation Issues in welfare reform (Communities SC 2011); Mutual and Co-operative 
approaches to delivering local services (Communities SC 2012); Localism (Communities SC 2011); The Big 
Society (Public Admin Select Committee 2011); Further Report on The Big Society (Public Admin SC 20912); 
Citizens and public services (Public Admin SC 2013); Department of Communities and Local Government: 
Financial sustainability of local authorities (PAC 2013).
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departments and agencies (and, where appropriate, NGOs and the private 
sector) to create proactive services that could be responsive to specific local or 
client circumstances and needs. The promise was greater impact at less cost. 
Four English pilots have now been successfully completed. The program was 
administered by the Department of Communities and Local Government. In 
essence, this program brought together public and private sector bodies to 
develop new ways of delivering local services. It aimed to increase efficiency 
and improve service outcomes through more integrated service provision across 
multiple agencies. The project commenced in 2011 and local authorities were 
invited to apply to participate in the pilots. 
The pilots involved joint project teams from central government and the relevant 
authorities. The teams first mapped highest cost services/categories and then 
sought to devise joined-up programs. This work was supported by five technical 
advisory sub-groups, each focusing on developing a methodology for a specific 
policy area: health and adult social care; criminal justice; families with complex 
needs; the economy; and education and early years. These groups identified 
sources of information on unit costs and outcomes and promoted consistency 
in assumptions. 
The approach is described in detail in evidence to the Communities Select 
Committee (Localism HC 547, 7 June 2011), in an NAO report ( 2013) and also in 
a comprehensive report for the Local Government Association (2013). 
The following is a brief sketch of each pilot: 
West Cheshire: Total public service spends in the area in 2010–2011: £2.4 
billion. A Public Services Board was established to provide overall strategic 
and managerial direction. The project united local authorities with four central 
departments (Health, Justice, Education, and Home Office). Collaboration was 
developed around five themes: starting well (early intervention in complex 
families); working well (local economic growth, work ready individuals); living 
well (community empowerment, safer communities, affordable housing); ageing 
well (home services); and smarter services (integrated asset management, poled 
customer insight, data sharing, strategic commissioning). Estimated savings: 
£56 million over five years.
Essex: Total public service spend in the area in 2010–2011: £12.8 billion. 
This involved 15 local authorities. An Executive Board was established. 
Collaboration was developed around four themes: families with complex needs; 
economic opportunity (focused on skills and infrastructure); community safety 
(reducing reoffending and domestic abuse); and health and well-being (focused 
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on integrated commissioning). Estimated £414 million in net benefits over six 
years, comprising £127 million of cashable savings and £287 million of economic, 
social and fiscal benefits.
Greater Manchester: Total public service spend in the area in 2010–2011: £21 
billion. The project involved 10 unitary authorities represented by the Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority. There were four themes: early years (school 
readiness, links to ‘troubled families’ work stream); worklessness; reducing 
reoffending (young people, women and repeat offenders); and integrated health 
and social care (dementia and psychiatric, drugs and alcohol, end-of-life, fit-for-
work, acute conditions). £270 million of net savings over five years
West London Tri-borough: Total public service spend in the area in 2010–2011: 
£6 billion. Involved three London boroughs: Westminster, Kensington and 
Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham. Oversight through an established board. 
Themes included troubled and complex families; work and skills; health and 
social care; strategic coordination of infrastructure. Collaborative planning 
commenced in 2011 and involved shared library, adult social care, and children’s 
services across three boroughs. This is to be extended to integration of public 
health functions and corporate services covering ICT and facilities. Estimated 
£70 million of net savings annually
The National Audit Office (NAO) assessment (NAO 2013) supported these 
initiatives. The report also highlighted the need to develop more robust, 
standardised measurement tools as experience accumulated. As a result of 
these experiments, more robust methodologies are being developed to measure 
savings and to allocate contributions, ‘including financial incentives or funding 
arrangements that encourage partners to invest across organisational boundaries, 
particularly where reform takes longer to be financially viable’ (NAO 2013, p. 10). 
As might be expected, in a change on this scale the development of methodologies 
and protocols remains a work-in-progress — refined arrangements remain to be 
fully developed in a number of areas including: 
• standardised information and information sharing protocols; 
• a protocol concerning the sharing of savings, particularly where costs and 
benefits accrue to different agencies and/or over significantly different time 
periods; 
• how incentives for participation can be maintained and strengthened over a 
program whose pay-offs are relatively long term; and
• how accountability structures might be reframed. 
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The NAO also commented: ‘The anticipated savings from this initial exercise may 
appear modest compared with total public expenditure. However it is still early 
days … Importantly, the current exercise focused on testing a new way of working 
rather than maximising the results over the short term’ (NAO 2013, p. 24).
The program described above has involved methodologies for co-funding 
between departments and agencies, and has also shown how initial protocols 
might be developed surrounding accountability, HR assignments, and the 
sharing of returns. 
But the enduring success of this approach also requires a public service culture 
that is open to innovation. This involves prioritising, as a subject for routine 
attention, continuous improvement via service design. Here the Cameron 
government has commissioned six independent bodies to constitute what it has 
termed ‘What Works Institutes’. Their remit is exercised under the auspices of 
the Cabinet Office. Their role is to identify sectors of pressing social need and 
major public spending, where an evidence base exists but where this is either 
not synthesised authoritatively or where communication of findings is deficient. 
The aim is to aid strategic and operational development and day-to-day practice 
amongst at least three distinct groups:
• Commissioning staff: In areas where services are delivered by NGO or for-
profit contracts, the institutes will assist those who commission services in 
informing their decisions on how best to spend public money;
• Service managers: In areas of direct service provision, the institutes will 
assist public services managers in establishing how best to deliver public 
services and how to improve their service; and,
• Policy managers: In policy design, the institutes will assist departments in 
developing an informed view of what is and is not cost effective in public 
services.
The six centres cover: health and social care, education attainment, ageing 
better, local growth, crime reduction, and effective early intervention. Together 
these centres cover some £200 billion of public spending.
To ensure research outputs are utilised by government, a senior civil servant 
has been appointed as National Advisor to engage with ministers and other 
stakeholder groups. This officer is located in the Cabinet Office and reports to 
the Minister for Government Policy and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury.
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Place-based approaches in recent OECD work 
The extent and variety of place-based approaches in recent OECD studies 
indicate the emergent appeal of this framework. In the quest for sustainable 
economic development, jobs and the effective provision of public services, 
the establishment of context-specific capabilities are seen to be primary. They 
represent the next move in the development of public management. Place-
based approaches are suggested for a variety of contexts including economic 
development and innovation, social development, city and rural development, 
unemployment, deprived areas, and high needs contexts. This is indicated in the 
following list of recent studies (with additional studies listed in the footnote):
• Managing Accountability and Flexibility in Labour Market Policy (2011)
• Breaking out of Policy Silos: Doing more with less (2010)
• Strategies to Improve Rural Service Delivery (2010)
• Regions Matter: Economic Recovery, Innovation and Sustainable Growth (2009)
• How Regions Grow: Trends and Analysis (2009)
• Linking Regions and Central Government: Contracts for Regional Development 
(2007)
• Governing Regional Development Policy: The Use of Indicators (2009)
• Flexible Policy for More and Better Jobs (2009)
• Linking Regions and Central Government: Contracts for Regional Development 
(2007)
• The New Rural paradigm: Policies and Governance (2006)6
One proposition is common to these reports: while it is paramount to get 
institutions right at the local or regional level, there is no one-size-fits-all 
solution. According to one OECD analyst:
In many countries, the regional/central vertical governance gap is 
significant: the centre faces information gaps and the regions confront 
capacity gaps. Moreover, it makes little sense to speak of ‘centralisation’ 
or decentralisation in general – the details are always the key (Coleman 
2010). 
Historic, institutional and local characteristics should shape governance designs. 
For example, in relation to development, the emphasis is on differentiated 
6 Delivering Local Development through a Comprehensive Approach to Strategy, System and Leadership: 
Highlighting the case of Derry–Londonderry, Northern Ireland (2011); New Approaches to Rural Policy: 
Lesson for around the world (2005); The New Rural Paradigm, Policies and Governance (2006); OECD 
Territorial Reviews: France (2006); Job Rich Growth: Strategies for local employment, skills development and 
social protection (2011); OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook (2010).
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strategies and organisational designs which can detect and then exploit existing 
or potential niches or opportunities. Implicit in all of the foregoing is the key 
role of local engagement and empowerment. 
In designing place-based arrangements, the OECD has developed two 
frameworks. The first sets out systematically the seven core dimensions of a 
governance system: information, capacity, funding, policy, administration, 
objectives and accountability (see Table 1). These individual elements are 
defined as follows (Chairbit 2011):
i. An information gap is characterised by information asymmetries 
between levels of government when designing, implementing and 
delivering public policies. Sometimes the information gap results from 
strategic behaviours of public actors who may prefer not to reveal 
too clearly their strengths and weaknesses, especially if allocation of 
responsibility is associated with conditional granting. However, it is 
often the case that the very information about territorial specificities is 
not perceived by the central decision maker whilst sub national actors 
may be ignorant about capital objectives and strategies.
ii. The capacity challenge arises when there is a lack of human knowledge 
or resources available to carry out tasks, regardless of the level of 
government (even if, in general sub national governments are considered 
to be suffering more from such difficulties than central government).
iii. The fiscal gap is represented by the difference between territorial 
revenues and the required expenditures to meet local responsibilities 
and implement appropriate development strategies. In a more dynamic 
perspective, fiscal difficulties also include mismatch between budget 
practices and policy needs: in the absence of multi-annual budget 
practices for example, local authorities may face uncertainty in engaging 
in appropriate spending, and/or face a lack of flexibility in spending 
despite its appropriateness in uncertain contexts. Too strict earmarking 
of grants may also impede appropriate fungibility of resources and limit 
ability to deliver adapted policies.
iv. The policy challenge results when line ministries take a purely vertical 
be implemented at the territorial level. By contrast, local authorities 
are best to customise complementarities between policy fields and 
concretise cross-sectional approaches. Limited coordination among 
line ministries may provoke a heavy administrative burden, different 
timing and agenda in managing correlated actions etc. It can even lead 
to strong inconsistencies when objectives of sectoral policymakers are 
contradictory.
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v. The administrative gap occurs when the administrative scale for policy 
making, in terms of spending as well as strategic planning, is not in line 
with relevant functional areas. A very common case concerns municipal 
fragmentation which can lead jurisdictions to initiate ineffective public 
action by not benefitting from economies of scale. Some specific policies 
also require very specific and often naturally fixed, boundaries.
vi. The active gap refers to different rationalities from national and sub-
national policymakers which create obstacles for adopting convergent 
strategies. Common examples arise from political and departmental 
purposes. Divergences across levels of government can be used for 
‘cornering’ the debate instead of serving common purposes. A local 
mayor may prefer to serve constituents perceived aspirations instead 
of aligning decisions to national or state wide objectives which may be 
perceived as contradictory.
vii. The accountability challenge results from the difficulty to ensure 
transparency of practices across different constituencies and levels 
of government. It also concerns possible integrity challenges of 
policymakers involved in the management of public investment.
These ‘gaps’ together constitute the architecture that is essential for effective 
place designs. In the absence of appropriate arrangements in any one building 
block, the entire design of place governance is put at risk. In turn, this 
emphasises the significance of a diagnostic phase in which local conditions, 
needs and circumstances need to be clearly identified.
The second framework, ‘Bridging Coordination and Capacity Gaps’ (see Table 
2), illustrates the approaches adopted in various states to overcome coordination 
and capacity gaps. A particular state might use various combinations of these 
instruments, depending on what it seeks to achieve through decentralisation 
and what coordination and capacity gaps are relevant. The key point again is the 
variety of approaches that are evident around OECD states and the specifically 
local character of any particular design. 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9 . The Dysfunctionality of New Public Management: 
287
A decentralised approach is reinforced in literatures on regional innovation 
systems to which we now turn.
EU ‘learning-by-doing’, experimentalist or 
pragmatist governance
The European Union (EU) is a complex multi-level governance design for which 
it is hard to find precedents. In areas where common action has been agreed, 
the diversity of approaches and structures between member states ruled out 
top-down or one-size-fits-all designs. So how could action be coordinated? In 
answering this latter question, the EU has introduced an approach which may 
have applications to coordinated action between and within levels of government 
in Australia, specifically in the context of remote Australia. 
The EU approach replaces principal-agent designs with a ‘learning-by-doing’ 
or pragmatist one (Sabel and Zeitlin 2011). The former design continues to 
dominate public policy thinking in Australia. A central tenet of principal-
agent theory is that the principal can determine desired outcomes in advance. 
Pre-determined performance metrics allow the principal to hold the agent 
accountable for outcomes, thus obviating shirking, opportunism and other 
deceptive behaviour on the part of the agent. This has been widely applied in 
public sector settings in Australia — in a variety of human services contracts, 
for example (see Marsh and Spies-Butcher 2009). But the diversity of conditions 
across the country has required adaptation. Hence in equalising comparisons 
the centre adds in a variety of qualifying factors that it considers appropriate. 
Influenced by this thinking, elaborate contractual, co-production, outsourcing 
and reporting structures have developed in a variety of fields (for example, 
surveyed in Productivity Commission 2010).
At least three basic features of human service (and other) contexts undercut 
advance determination of outcomes by a centrally located principal:
• First, the knowledge guiding the decisions of both principals and agents is 
provisional: both are operating with corrigible information and judgements. 
Unintended consequences, ambiguity and difference abound. It is impossible 
to devise programs from first principles that survive the effort to realise 
them. In the case of the principal, this involves judgements about attainable 
outcomes and, in the case of agents, this involves judgements about the 
practices most likely to enhance performance in the pursuit of these outcomes.
• Second, providers have information that is essential to adapting performance 
outcomes for the overall system that recognise best practice: the principal is 
setting outcomes that need to reconcile efficiency and quality in a way that 
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minimises incentives for provider gamesmanship, creates incentives for 
efficiency and that does so in a way that also promotes quality services for 
clients. Any one of the outcomes is complex. Their achievement in combination 
is a daunting challenge. Only the providers have information that is relevant 
to making this latter judgement. The principal needs routine access to 
provider information in order to refine and develop her understanding of 
desired outcomes in the light of provider and client experience.
• Third, providers’ own knowledge of how to attain quality services for clients is 
varied and developing: providers’ own knowledge of how best to serve clients 
— and how best to establish organisational and governance routines that 
reinforce these outcomes — is itself corrigible and experimental. Different 
organisations will attain different outcomes and it will not be immediately 
apparent which represents the best achievement of not necessarily consistent 
purposes. Dynamic efficiency through the whole system thus requires the 
routine collection, assessment and dissemination of performance information 
amongst providers. 
An ‘experimentalist’ or pragmatist approach represents an alternative to these 
architectures, but one that promises to shift exchanges from a primarily punitive 
to a primarily learning basis (Sabel 2004; Sabel and Zeitlin 2011). This builds on 
earlier work on continuous performance improvement and ‘learning by doing’ 
— an approach to dynamic efficiency that was developed by the Toyota Motor 
Company in its management of buyer–supplier relationships (Sabel 1992). Here 
is how this might be translated to public policy settings:
General goals or designs are set provisionally by the highest level — 
parliament, a regulatory authority, or the relevant corporate executives 
… then the provisional goals are revised in the light of proposals by 
lower level units responsible for executing key aspects of the overall 
task (Sabel 2004, p. 11).
Sabel proposes to recast fundamentally the terms of the accountability 
relationship between principals and agents:
Compliance or accountability in the principal agent sense of rule 
following is There are in effect no fixed rules, or, what comes to the 
same thing, a key rule is to continuously evaluate possible changes in 
the rules. Accountability thus requires not comparison of performance to 
a goal or rule, but reason giving: actors in the new institutions are called 
upon to explain their use of the autonomy they are accorded in pursuing 
the corrigible goals [emphasis mine]. These accounts enable evaluation of 
their choices in the light of explanations provided by actors in similar 
circumstances making different ones and vice versa.
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Agents who fail to perform to best-practice levels are first given the chance 
to improve via an exchange of knowledge about their potential to improve: 
‘Repeated failure to respond, even with assistance, is, however, likely to bring 
about the dissolution of the offending unit’ (Sabel 2004, p. 14). This broad 
approach has been widely tested in a variety of human services and other public 
policy settings in the US (Sabel and Simon 2010). 
Pragmatist or experimental principles define an approach to the management of 
intergovernmental and purchaser–provider relations wholly different from the 
structure that is now dominant in federal and state jurisdictions. The alternative 
‘experimentalist’ or pragmatist approach to system design builds on a broad 
structure of intergovernmental and purchaser–provider relationship, but places 
exchange in a context that emphasises learning by both parties. 
Australian local government practice
The foregoing discussion focused on regions as the relevant spatial unit and 
involved governance models drawn from international practice. Parallel 
experiments and possibilities are also evident in Australian local government 
practice. The models that have been developed here have clear implications for 
imagining various possible forms of regional governance. These local government 
arrangements are comprehensively explored in a report of the collaborative 
practices of shires in remote Queensland (Dollery and Johnson 2007). The report 
documents the many imaginative responses of individual councils to preserve 
community amenities and to reconcile local responsiveness with efficient 
resource management and relationships with other levels of government. The 
focus of the report is the Remote Area Planning and Development Board which 
is a not-for-profit, Australian Securities and Investments Commission-listed 
company involving a collaboration of 11 councils in western Queensland. Its 
core concerns are transport, regional planning, capacity building, natural 
resource management, service development, technology and communications, 
development of sustainable industries, and investment attraction.
The report documents the many imaginative roles that are being undertaken 
by the individual councils to ensure community amenities are maintained at 
desired standards:
In the absence of any other feasible service providers, local councils must 
provide a large range of essentials services. For instance, there are not 
many councils in Australia that provide the postal services (as in Barcoo 
and Ilfracombe); offer banking facilities (Blackall, Boulia, Tambo and 
Winton); a café (as in Boulia, Isisford and Winton); undertaker services 
(Barcoo, Blackall, Boulia, Ilfracombe and Tambo); real estate agency 
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activities (Diamentina); operate general stores (Ilfracombe and Isisford); 
provide freight services (Isisford); or operate the local newspaper 
(Blackall) … In addition, each council provides extensive support to the 
humorous community and sporting organisations in their boundaries 
(Dollery and Johnson 2007, p. 104).
Other services include:
Aramac Shire either directly or indirectly provides … a bakery, Home 
and Community Care programs, and a rural transaction centre. Similarly, 
Barcaldine Shire delivers a number of state government programs 
including rural family support, 60 and Better, Home Assist Secure and 
a HACC program … BARCO Shire Council provides the Jundah Post 
Office … the Council provides a bus service and a 4WD vehicle for the 
three schools in the Shire; the Council provided land for the Windorah 
Medical Clinic; it provided land for state community housing; it has 
undertaker services and provides burial services … Barcoo Shire has 
set up a bursary system for residents undertaking tertiary, diploma or 
trade qualifications … Blackall Shire assist its residents by providing 
an ‘in-store’ Westpac Bank facility in the Council office and it acts as a 
‘developer’ baby providing an industrial estate as well as residential land 
for sale … [it] runs an extensive local economic development program … 
an airport (with 3 commercial flights a week); SBS radio transmission; 
youth development services, including employment initiatives (Dollery 
and Johnson 2007, p. 105–106).
Conclusion
The foregoing suggests the timeliness of a shift of governance towards more 
place-based spatial levels. This is the next logical step in the development of 
public sector governance. As noted at the outset, this is wholly consistent 
with the vision for public sector reform advanced in a number of recent official 
reports; for example, at the federal level, in the Moran Review (AGRGA 2010); 
and at a state level, in the Western Australian Economic Audit Committee 
Report (WAEAC 2009). This latter report specifically foreshadows the 
replacement of ‘agencies operating in silos’ with more decentralised citizen-
focused arrangements. Both these reports underline the profound challenge 
to centralised processes, cultures and organisational and budgetary protocols 
that are involved in a further iteration of public sector reform. The evidence 
reviewed in the last section suggests governance designs are available — but, as 
British experience attests, the difficulties in translating aspirations into practice 
remain formidable. No less profound obstacles can be anticipated in Australia. 
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Indeed here they are compounded by intergovernmental considerations. On 
the other hand, both fiscal and political imperatives imply dictate a shift to 
citizen focused services. The demand for more proactive services that are and 
sensitive to context will not go away. In charting a new path, a first challenge is 
to imagination — there is another way.
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